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The overnight interest rate is the price paid for one day loans and deﬁnes the short end of
the yield curve. It is the equilibrium outcome of supply and demand for bank reserves. This
paper models the intertemporal decision problems in the reserve market for both central and
commercial banks. All important institutional features of the euro area reserve market are
included. The model is then estimated with euro area data. A permanent change in reserve
supply of one billion euro moves the overnight rate by eight basis points into the opposite
direction, hence, there is a substantial liquidity eﬀect. Most of the predictable patterns for the
mean and the volatility of the overnight rate are related to monetary policy implementation,
but also some calendar day eﬀects are present. Banks react sluggishly to new information.
Implications for market eﬃciency, endogeneity of reserve supply and underbidding are studied.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52; E58; E43.
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September 2004Non-technical summary
This paper studies the determinants of the overnight interest rate and quantiﬁes them.
The overnight interest rate is the equilibrium outcome of supply and demand for bank reserves.
The here developed structural model for both supply and demand for reserves allows a detailed
analysis of the interactions between the central bank, as the sole net supplier of reserves, and
commercial banks, on the demand side. The precise set-up of this market, i.e. institutional
details of the reserve market, has important implications for the behavior of the overnight rate,
both for conditional mean and variance. These implications are derived from a theoretical
model and their magnitudes are estimated for the euro area overnight rate.
The behavior of the overnight interest rate is important for several reasons. Firstly, in
most monetary models the central bank is assumed to have perfect control over the interest
rate. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy in these models starts at the short-
term interest rate. A change in the short-term rate works through to long-term interest rates.
These long-term rates are the relevant variables for ﬁrms’ investment and households’ savings
decisions. Investment and saving then inﬂuence output and prices, the ﬁnal objectives of
a central bank. However, the control of the short-term interest rate is far from perfect in
practice. Interest rates are determined on markets, being inﬂuenced by both supply and
demand side factors. The central bank has a strong inﬂuence on the supply side, but is
not able to control it perfectly. This paper studies the, widely overlooked, ﬁrst step in the
monetary transmission mechanism, the relation between reserves and the overnight rate. In
particular, the assumption made in many models that the central bank has perfect control over
the interest rate is analyzed. The ways in which the details of monetary policy implementation
aﬀect the behavior of the interest rate are documented.
Secondly, the short-term rate is an important explanatory variable for long-term interest
rates. According to the expectation hypothesis the N-period yield is the average of expected
future one-period yields, possibly adjusted for a risk premium. Therefore, understanding
better the behavior of the short end of the yield curve - the overnight rate - helps explaining
other interest rates further out the term structure as well.
Thirdly, in eﬃcient markets there are no (long-lasting) arbitrage opportunities. Pre-
dictable patterns usually provide such arbitrage opportunities. Both mean and volatility of
the overnight rate are tested for predictable patterns and implications for market eﬃciency
are investigated.
Finally, central banks have a natural interest in studying the determinants of the overnight
rate. This is particularly true nowadays as the operating target of many central banks is a
short-term interest rate. The behavior of the overnight rate depends on reserve supply, but
equally important on the institutional framework for the reserve market.
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rate and to permanent changes in supply of reserves. In fact, a substantial liquidity eﬀect
is estimated: a change in reserve supply of one billion euro, expected to prevail till the end
of the reserve maintenance period, moves the interbank rate eight basis points into the op-
posite direction. The theoretical model relates the magnitude of the liquidity eﬀect to the
distribution of supply shocks, which is conﬁrmed by the data. Interestingly, banks do not
react immediately to supply changes. This sluggish reaction to supply changes is not easily
explained for rational agents. Temporary supply changes have no eﬀect on the overnight rate.
Predictable patterns are found for the overnight rate. The mean is high at the last day
of a month, even higher on the end of a semester or a year. The end of the month, semester
and year increases are completely reversed at the ﬁr s td a yo ft h ef o l l o w i n gm o n t h . E n do f
month eﬀects are most likely due to window dressing operations. The mean of the overnight
rate does not vary systematically throughout the reserve maintenance period. Therefore, the
short-term money market does not contain clear arbitrage opportunities, with the possible
exception of the sluggish reaction to supply shocks.
The conditional volatility of the overnight rate is closely related to monetary policy imple-
mentation. Conditional volatility is especially high at the allotment day of the last open mar-
ket operation in a reserve maintenance period, and even higher at days afterwards. Volatility
increases at the day of a change in the policy rate and around the end of a month.
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This paper studies the determinants of the overnight interest rate and quantiﬁes them. The
o v e r n i g h ti n t e r e s tr a t ei sa tt h es h o r te n do ft h ey i e l dc u r v ea n dt h ee q u i l i b r i u mo u t c o m eo f
supply and demand for bank reserves. The here developed structural model for both supply
and demand for reserves allows an in-depth analysis of the interaction between the central
bank, as the sole net supplier of reserves, and commercial banks, on the demand side. The
precise set-up of this market, i.e. institutional details of the reserve market, has important
implications for the behavior of the overnight rate, both for conditional mean and variance.
These implications are derived from a theoretical model and their magnitudes are estimated
for the euro area overnight rate.
The behavior of the overnight interest rate is important for several reasons. Firstly, in
most monetary models the central bank is assumed to have perfect control over the interest
rate. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy in these models starts at the short-
term interest rate.1 A change in the short-term rate works through to long-term interest
rates. These long-term rates are the relevant variables for ﬁrms’ investment and households’
savings decisions. Investment and saving then inﬂuence output and prices, the ﬁnal objectives
of a central bank. However, the control of the short-term interest rate is far from perfect in
practice. Interest rates are determined on markets, being inﬂuenced by both supply and
demand side factors. The central bank has a strong inﬂuence on the supply side, but is
not able to control it perfectly. This paper studies the, widely overlooked, ﬁrst step in the
monetary transmission mechanism, the relation between reserves and the overnight rate. In
particular, the assumption made in many models that the central bank has perfect control over
the interest rate is analyzed. The ways in which the details of monetary policy implementation
aﬀect the behavior of the interest rate are documented.
Secondly, the short-term rate is an important explanatory variable for long-term interest
rates. According to the expectation hypothesis the N-period yield is the average of expected
future one-period yields, possibly adjusted for a risk premium.2 Therefore, understanding
better the behavior of the short end of the yield curve - the overnight rate - helps explaining
other interest rates further out the term structure as well.3
Thirdly, in eﬃcient markets there are no (long-lasting) arbitrage opportunities. Pre-
dictable patterns usually provide such arbitrage opportunities. Both mean and volatility of
1See for example Walsh (1998) for a book-length treatment of monetary models.
2Cochrane (2001) discusses extensively the expectation hypothesis and reviews models for the term struc-
ture of interest rates.
3See e.g. Fabozzi and Modigliani (1996) for a general analysis of money markets. More speciﬁcally, Cassola
and Morana (2003 and 2004) and Cassola and Moschitz (2004) analyse the transmission of volatility along the
euro area yield curve.
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are investigated.
Finally, central banks have a natural interest in studying the determinants of the overnight
rate. This is particularly true nowadays as the operating target of many central banks is a
short-term interest rate.4 The behavior of the overnight rate depends on reserve supply, but
equally important on the institutional framework for the reserve market.
With these issues in mind the overnight rate is analyzed and the reserve market is discussed
with respect to market eﬃciency, the importance of institutional features and the ability of
the central bank to control the interest rate.
In the literature so far the overnight interest rate has not been analyzed extensively,
especially in the euro area. One of the earliest statistical descriptions of the daily behavior of
the US overnight rate is given by Hamilton (1996 and 1997). More recently, also Bartolini et al.
(2001 and 2002) develop models for the US overnight rate, which is known as the federal funds
rate. Although the basic set-up in the US and euro area reserve markets are similar, there
are important institutional diﬀerences making these models not very good descriptions of the
euro area overnight rate. Pérez and Rodríguez (2003) provide an optimizing model for reserve
demand in the euro area. Gaspar et al. (2004) expand this model to heterogeneous banks.
Bindseil and Seitz (2001) model the supply of reserves in close relation to the institutional
set-up in the euro area, but the demand side is not derived explicitly. Välimäki (2002) is
the ﬁrst one to provide a model of optimizing behavior for both supply and demand side.
However, he makes the simplifying assumption of daily supply of reserves. Under normal
circumstances reserves are supplied only once a week in the euro area. Würtz (2003) proposes
an econometric model of the overnight rate, focusing mainly on an empirical description. On
the contrary, the present paper derives the empirical formulation from a structural model
of both supply and demand for reserves, which allows to pin down precisely the eﬀects of
implementation issues on the interest rate. Furthermore, the exact supply measure relevant
for demand decisions is used and possible endogeneity of reserve supply is tackled.
The present analysis starts with a theoretical model for both supply and demand in the
euro area reserve market. The central bank is the sole net supplier of reserves and commercial
banks represent the demand side. The model is set up in an intertemporal optimization frame-
work. Not only the current situation in the market is relevant for decisions, but also expected
future events. The demand side follows closely Pérez and Rodríguez (2003), augmenting it in
order to allow changes in the policy rate. The policy rate is the target rate for the overnight
rate.5 Since banks are forward looking expected changes in the policy rate are important for
4Borio (1997) oﬀers a detailed discussion of monetary policy operating procedures in industrial countries.
5T h em i n i m u mb i dr a t eo fv a r i a b l er a t et e n d e r sa n dt h er a t ea p p l i e dt oﬁxed rate tenders for the euro area
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side, including all main institutional features of the central bank’s operating procedure, is
necessary to characterize adequately the determination of the overnight rate. Therefore, the
supply of reserves is modeled with a weekly frequency.
Special attention is paid to distinguish expected, unexpected, temporary and permanent
supply changes and their eﬀects on the overnight rate. The weekly frequency of the central
bank’s supply of liquidity implies reserve holdings to change expectedly throughout the week.
In addition there are unexpected changes, the so-called supply shocks. In general, these
supply shocks are temporary. However, if they occur after the last regular liquidity supply in
a reserve maintenance period, these supply shocks have a permanent eﬀect. In this case there
is no further (regular) supply of liquidity within the same maintenance period to make up for
past supply shocks. Accordingly, supply shocks accumulate until the end of the maintenance
period and become permanent supply changes.
The equilibrium in the reserve market is discussed extensively. The model also allows to
analyze a special situation in the reserve market, the so-called underbidding. If the policy
rate is expected to decrease in the near future total demand for bank reserves decreases
immediately. In this case the central bank is not able to supply the desired amount of
reserves. The total amount of reserves is then determined at the demand side, by commercial
banks. Since reserves are supplied via auctions, this situation has been labelled underbidding.
Underbidding is the consequence of some speciﬁc characteristics in the reserve market and
will be discussed below.
The theoretical model is then taken to the data. Great care is applied in dealing with
non-standard statistical properties of the overnight rate. Numerous speciﬁcation tests are
performed and sub-sample stability is analyzed.
One of the main issues in this paper is to determine the eﬀect of a change in reserve supply
on the interest rate. A negative relation between reserves and the interest rate is expected.
This negative relation is usually called the liquidity eﬀect.6 However, it is necessary to clarify
what exactly is meant in the present paper by the liquidity eﬀect.
Empirical evidence for a liquidity eﬀect comes from Christiano (1991), Gordon and Leeper
(1992), Galí (1992), Strongin (1995), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Kim and Ghazali (1998)
and Thornton (2001b), among others. Most of those works use monthly or quarterly data, and
so the main diﬃculty is the identiﬁcation of the relevant money supply and demand equations.
Hamilton (1997) proposes an alternative by using daily data giving way for other identifying
main reﬁnancing operations can be interpreted as such a target rate.
6Ewerhart et al. (2004) show that under some circumstances the liquidity eﬀect in the money market can
be reversed; a low overnight rate may be associated with a scarce liquidity situation, or correspondingly a high
overnight rate may be associated with ample liquidity.
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papers identify the same eﬀect. There are two diﬀerent, although not unrelated, mechanisms
at work. On the one hand, there is a daily demand for reserves in order to fulﬁll reserve
requirements. If this demand is interest rate elastic, a reaction of the overnight rate to a
change in liquidity is found. On the other hand, there is a longer-term interest rate elasticity
of reserves. Banks have to hold a certain proportion of demand deposits as reserves. Those
demand deposits are assumed to depend on an interest rate as opportunity cost. Therefore,
if the interest rate changes, demand for deposits changes, and proportionally also reserve
requirements. Whether this reaction happens contemporaneously depends on institutional
features of reserve fulﬁllment. In the euro area required reserves are calculated from the
previous month’s deposits. This is to say that a change in today’s interest rate aﬀects next
month’s reserve requirement and next month’s demand for reserves. Hence, the relationship
between demand deposits and interest rate cannot be identiﬁed on a contemporaneous basis.
Following this argumentation, the present work identiﬁes the ﬁrst eﬀect, the liquidity eﬀect
on a daily basis. In other words, the responsiveness of the interbank rate to daily changes
in the supply of reserves is analyzed. Although a possible relation between both eﬀects is
recognized, the further analysis of this issue is left for future research.
The next section provides a theoretical model for the reserve market. Both supply and
demand for reserves are carefully modeled. The equilibrium overnight rate is derived. The
eﬀects of expected and unexpected supply changes on the interest rate are discussed. Under-
bidding is found to be an equilibrium outcome in the present set-up of the reserve market.
Section 3 takes the model to the data. Numerous speciﬁcation tests are performed and the
determinants of the EONIA rate, a volume-weighted average of interbank overnight rates in
the euro area, are analyzed extensively. Section 4 concludes and outlines further research.
The appendix contains all graphs, ﬁgures and tables. In particular, it includes an illustration
of the reserve market and a graphical summary of the theoretical model, as well as a detailed
description of the data used and a review of predictable patterns in mean and volatility of
the overnight rate.
2 A model of the reserve market
The reserve market is a money market where overnight, unsecured loans of reserves are ex-
changed.7 In what follows a model for both, demand and supply side of this particular
interbank market is set up. There are two types of agents in the market, the central bank on
one hand and commercial banks on the other hand. The key ingredients of the model are the
7The very short-term money market in the US is called the federal funds market.
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euro area interbank market. Both issues have important implications. Firstly, demand and
supply equations are not simply postulated, rather they are derived from the ﬁrst order condi-
tions of the maximization problem, and so reﬂecting optimizing behavior of agents. Secondly,
the institutional set-up of the interbank market inﬂuences the behavior of agents, therefore,
the exact representation of institutional key features is necessary for an adequate model.
Commercial banks are obliged to hold deposits of a certain amount at the central bank,
i.e. to hold a certain amount of reserves. However, this reserve requirement does not have to
be fulﬁlled on a daily basis, rather it has to be fulﬁlled on average over a period of one month,
which is called the reserve maintenance period (RMP).8 The allowance of fulﬁlling reserves on
average leads banks to face an intertemporal decision problem. Banks have to decide on an
optimal path of daily reserve holdings. Given that banks have a certain amount of liquidity, it
follows that the amount not desired to be held as reserves can be lend to other banks through
the interbank market. In case a bank wants to hold more reserves than it has liquidity
available, it can borrow at the interbank market. The price paid at the interbank market is
the interbank rate. In addition, liquidity can be obtained from (or deposited at) the central
bank, where the price for borrowing from the central bank is called the marginal lending rate,
and the price for depositing at the central bank is called the deposit rate. To sum up, each
bank decides every day on how much reserves to hold, how to act on the interbank market and
what recourse to take to the standing facilities, i.e. how much to borrow from or deposit at
the central bank. These decisions are made by maximizing proﬁts from reserve management,
taking the reserve requirement as a constraint. Proﬁts are revenues minus costs, where costs
of reserve management are given by borrowing from the central bank (at the lending rate)
and at the interbank market (at the interbank rate), and revenues are interests earned by
depositing at the deposit facility and lending to other banks.
The central bank in the model supplies liquidity in order that commercial banks can fulﬁll
demand for reserves at an interest rate consistent with the policy rate i∗
t. Loosely speaking,
the central bank can be seen as minimizing deviations of the interbank rate it from the policy
rate i∗
t. Furthermore, the central bank also provides liquidity for the so-called autonomous
factors. Examples of autonomous factors are banknotes in circulation and Treasury deposits.
Figure 1 summarizes the above described interactions among central and commercial banks.
The timing of the model is represented in ﬁg u r e2 . W h e nt h em a r k e to p e n st h ec e n t r a l
bank decides how much liquidity to supply, taking into account expected demand for reserves
(at the policy rate) and the expected size of autonomous factors. Afterwards, commercial
banks decide on how much reserves to hold and the interbank rate results. The market closes
8The length of the reserve maintenance period in the US is two weeks.
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position at the central bank and proﬁts are determined. In general the central bank supplies
liquidity only once a week, on Wednesday. On the following days up till the next Wednesday
liquidity supply stays constant.9 Although supply of total liquidity is constant throughout a
week, reserve supply moves daily in response to shocks hitting the market.
The central bank’s balance sheet can be summarized in a very stylized way as showing
liquidity supply on the assets side and reserves holdings and autonomous factors on the
liabilities side. From the balance sheet identity and given the supply of liquidity, it is easy to
see that a change in the autonomous factors must be matched by an equal change of opposite
sign in the reserve position. It follows that a forecast error in the autonomous factors aﬀects
directly the reserve position of commercial banks, hence, can be interpreted as a shock to
supply of reserves. This shock changes banks’ end of the day reserve positions. When making
their decisions on reserve holdings banks take the existence of this supply shock into account.
2.1 Demand side
The demand side follows closely Pérez and Rodríguez (2003), being adapted to allow changes
in the policy rate as well as in lending and deposit rates. The economy consists of a continuum
of banks with measure one. Each bank maximizes expected proﬁts from reserve management
within each maintenance period, subject to the reserve requirement. The timing for any day
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9In practice most of the liquidity is indeed supplied weekly through open market operations (see the next
section for details). However, the maturity of these open market operations is two weeks. Note that from
March 2004 onwards the maturity of open market operations will be reduced to one week (see e.g. ECB, 2004).
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t > 0). In case of a potential overdraft an automatic recourse to the
lending facility takes place in order to bring the bank’s daily reserve position back to zero.
Similarly, once the reserve requirements are fulﬁlled for the whole maintenance period (i.e.
R
j
t =0 ) , all liquidity is put automatically at the deposit facility, which is to say banks do
not hold more reserves than strictly necessary. The reserve requirement has to be fulﬁlled
throughout the RMP. It is not important at which day contributions to the reserve requirement
are made, but it has to be fulﬁl l e da tt h ee n do ft h eR M P ,i . e .t h er e s e r v er e q u i r e m e n tc a n
be written as R
j
T+1 =0 .
The model is solved backwards from the last day of the maintenance period, T,s i n c e
on that day reserve requirements have to be fulﬁlled at any cost and in consequence future
expected variables are not relevant for banks’ demand decisions.10 The resulting ﬁrst order
conditions describe the interbank rate it as a function of the bank’s reserves, A
j
t.A tt h el a s t
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with the aggregate state variable deﬁned as It = {it,i t+1,...,i T}. The value function at the
















10The derivation of the ﬁrst order conditions follows closely Pérez and Rodríguez (2003).
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Given the central bank’s supply of reserves, the above ﬁrst order conditions determine
the equilibrium interbank rate. These conditions are derived from optimizing behavior in the
reserve management and describe the typical path for the interbank rate. Before discussing
the behavior of the interbank rate further, the central bank’s supply of reserves is analyzed.
2.2 Supply side
The institutional details of the interbank market are crucial for understanding the behavior
of the interbank rate. So the supply side of the model closely matches the actual structure of
the liquidity management in the euro area.11
The central bank supplies liquidity in order to fulﬁll (expected) demand for reserves at
an interest rate consistent with the policy rate i∗
t. Loosely speaking, the central bank can be
seen as minimizing deviations of the interbank rate it from the policy rate i∗
t. Liquidity is
supplied only once a week, with a maturity of two weeks. The main reﬁnancing operations
of the European Central Bank (ECB) have exactly these characteristics and almost all the
liquidity provided in the euro area is supplied through main reﬁnancing operations.12
The central bank’s balance sheet identity requires at each day that
cat = omot + nsft − aft = ert + rrt (7)
or,
ert = omot − aft − rrt + nsft, (8)
where cat stands for current account holdings, omot for outstanding open market operations,
nsft for net recourse to standing facilities, aft for autonomous factors, ert for excess reserves
and rrt for required reserves.13 Note that current account holdings are the reserves commercial
11In what follows the benchmark liquidity policy is modelled. For a discussion of various liquidity policies
see e.g. Bindseil (2002).
12Besides main reﬁnancing operations also ﬁne tuning and long-term reﬁninancing operations are used by
the ECB to supply liquidity. However, ﬁne tuning operations are executed only under special circumstances.
Indeed, such ﬁne tuning operations have been performed very few times, namely at 21/6/2000, 30/4/2001, 12
and 13/9/2001, 28/11/2001, 4 and 10/1/2002, 18/12/2002 and 23/05/2003. Long term reﬁnancing operations
are structural measures and usually constant throughout the maintenance period.
13Note that, strictly speaking, the division into required reserves and excess reserves is deﬁned only at the
last day of the maintenance period. However, excess reserves at the last day of the maintenance period are




j=1 erT,j ≈ 0.7∗T billion euro (see the box
on liquidity conditions in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, various issues). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume
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omot = mrot + ltrot + ftot (9)
where mrot is the outstanding amount from main reﬁnancing operation, ltrot from long-term
reﬁnancing operations and ftot from ﬁne tuning operations. It is assumed that ltrot and ftot
are constant throughout the maintenance period, that is ltrot = ltro and ftot = fto for all
t =1 ,...,T.14
At an allotment day, normally Tuesday, the size of mrot is decided such that the expected
excess reserve holdings in seven days are equal to the target level er∗.A na m o u n ts u ﬃciently
large in order to provide for the expected autonomous factors and expected demand for
reserves, taking into account the expected recourse to standing facilities, is allotted.
Days throughout the maintenance period are denoted by t =1 ,...,T.A t t = s an e w
main reﬁnancing operation is settled, where s ∈ S = {s1,s 2,...,s k} with s1 being the ﬁrst
Wednesday in the maintenance period, and sk t h el a s to n e . 15 The central bank targets average
























with m =m i n {7,s−1} and n =m i n {6,T−t} and for all s ∈ S. At the ﬁrst allotment in the
maintenance period the average excess reserve measure, er∗
s1−1, takes into account forecast
errors only from t =1onwards, not including the days from the previous maintenance period.
A tt h el a s ta l l o t m e n tt h el i q u i d i t ys i t u a t i o na tT is targeted, not the liquidity situation at the
next allotment day.16
Finally, the possibility of changes in the policy rate and the so-called underbidding is























 − ltro− fto.
excess reserves are build up linearly throughout the maintenance period, which leads to deﬁne the daily excess
reserve, ert, to be constant at 0.7 billion euro. It follows that rrt = cat − 0.7.
14See footnote 12.
15All days t = s are called settlement days, whereas t = T is deﬁned as the last day in the reserve
maintenance period.
16In general, Es−1[ers+n] is around 0.7 ∗ (s + n) billion euro.
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September 2004The central bank provides suﬃcient liquidity such that targeted excess reserves, er∗
s, required






, are covered. Long-term







. Note that the central bank provides liquidity assuming a linear
fulﬁllment of reserve requirements, that is, rr =
PT
t=1 rrt
T . The second term on the right hand
side, (Es−1[ers+m(i∗
s)] − er∗
s), corrects for the so-called underbidding. Although the central
bank wants to provide a certain amount of liquidity, it cannot do so independently of demand.
If demand for main reﬁnancing operations is lower than the central bank’s desired supply, one
speaks of underbidding. Underbidding can be explained as the equilibrium outcome of an
expected policy rate decrease together with the interest rate elasticity of reserves. If the
policy rate is not expected to change, excess reserves next week are expected to equal this
week’s excess reserves, hence, the term in parenthesis cancels. If, however, banks expect the
policy rate to change, supply of liquidity is determined by the expected demand curve, at
the current policy rate. The demand curve shifts with the expected policy rate change, but
the current interbank rate does not change, because it is bounded from below by the current
policy rate.17 Therefore, supply is determined by the new demand for excess reserves, ers+m,
at the current policy rate i∗
s.























 − ltro− fto} + {fto+ ltro− aft − rrt + nsft}













 − aft + nsft. (13)
Note that the relevant settlement day is the most recent one, sl. However, for the ease of
exposition, the subscript is omitted whenever it is not misleading. Daily total supply of
17Liquidity has been alloted up to June 2000 through ﬁxed rate tenders and variable rate tenders afterwards.
However, a minimum bid rate is applied, which, in the underbidding case, deﬁn e sal o w e rb o u n df o rt h e
interbank rate. The minimum bid rate and the rate applied in ﬁxed rate tenders correspond to the mid-point
of lending and deposit rate, denoted here as policy rate.
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TRt = rr + ert (14)






















As discussed in the section on demand, in the present model it is assumed that recourse to
standing facilities takes place automatically, at the end of the day after the market has closed.
In this case nsft =0throughout the market session, and the relevant supply of reserves, ¯ Mt,
is given by ¯ Mt = TRt − nsft.18 Splitting up the autonomous factor term leads to:




















+ {Es−1 [aft] − aft}.
Three factors shift the daily supply of reserves, namely underbidding, deviations of the actual
autonomous factors from its average forecasts and the daily forecast errors itself. The ﬁrst
term in parenthesis on the right hand side represents underbidding, which is demand driven
and related to expectations on a changing policy rate. The second term, in braces, denotes
divergence of expected autonomous factors from its average forecast, which comes from the
fact that liquidity is supplied only once a week. The last term in braces represents daily
forecast errors, which are pure supply shocks. The supply shock which occurs at the end
of day t is denoted as ut = {Es−1 [aft] − aft}. The relevant supply variable for banks when
making their decision is Mt = ¯ Mt − ut, because the size of the supply shock becomes known
only after the market closes.
Note that if net recourse to standing facilities is interest rate elastic, total supply of
reserves, as given in equation (14), depends on the interest rate. This might be rationalized
b yt h ef a c tt h a ta tav e r yh i g hi n t e r e s tr a t eb a n k ss i m p l yﬁnance themselves by the marginal
lending facility, not making use of the interbank market any more. Similarly, if the interest
r a t ei sv e r yl o w ,i tm i g h tb ep r e f e r a b l et om a k eu s eo ft h ed e p o s i tf a c i l i t yi n s t e a do fl e n d i n g
to the interbank market.19
The deviation of actual excess reserves from its target is deﬁned as bt ≡ ert − er∗
s.T h e
variable bt depicts deviations from the neutral allotment, i.e. from a situation where liquid-
18In the US ¯ Mt is typically called non-borrowed reserves.
19See e.g. Thornton (2001a) for a similar formulation.
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If there is underbidding, the liquidity shortage created in the underbidding is expected to
prevail till the end of the maintenance period. However, forecast errors of autonomous factors
are expected to be oﬀset in the next main reﬁnancing operation. After the last allotment, ad-
ditionally accumulated daily forecast errors of autonomous factors and accumulated recourse
to standing facilities aﬀect the expected liquidity situation at the last day of the maintenance






{(Esk−1[afj] − afj)+nsfj}. (17)
2.3 Equilibrium
The interbank rate as equilibrium outcome of supply and demand for reserves is illustrated in
ﬁgures 3 and 4. The exact functional form of the demand curve depends on the distribution
function of the supply shocks. For illustrative purposes supply shocks are assumed to be
symmetric and drawn from a normal distribution. Figure 3 depicts the demand curve for




T)/2, whenever reserve deﬁciencies equal supply of liquidity, RT = MT,i n
other words, when there is no liquidity shortage throughout the market session. If RT 6= MT,
the interbank rate diﬀers from the policy rate. By how much the change in liquidity moves
the interest rate depends on the distribution function of the supply shock. During the market
session of day T, banks know that before the end of the maintenance period there is still one
supply shock, uT, to come. This shock can make up for reserve deﬁciencies or force a bank
to take recourse to marginal lending facility in case of overdraft. The probability of each of
these events is determined by the distribution of the supply shock and, hence, the interbank
rate reﬂecting these considerations also depends on the distribution of the shock. Reasons
why MT might deviate from RT are discussed in the following section.
The demand function for all other days is more complicated, since the expected value of





, which in general also depends on supply shocks, is
involved. However, from equation (4) it can be seen that for very large Mt the interbank rate
moves towards the deposit rate, id
t,a n df o rv e r ys m a l lMt the lending rate, il
t, is approached.
Besides that, the general model, as presented above, does not lead to a straightforward con-
18
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September 2004clusion on the exact shape of the demand curve. Nevertheless, the probabilities for Mt to
be so large (small) that the interest rate reaches the deposit (lending) rate are close to zero,






































Making use of a simplifying assumption on the supply side allows to approximate the middle
part of the demand curve. Suppose that the central bank performs open market operations
daily, opposed to weekly as assumed above. In this case expected interest rates do not
depend on supply shocks, because the central bank corrects daily for these supply shocks,
and consequently the expected interest rate simply depends on the expected policy rate and
the expected liquidity situation. The policy rate is by deﬁnition independent of daily supply
shocks and, in the simpliﬁed model, the expected liquidity situation is independent of supply
shocks, too. The demand curve then has a ﬂat part around the expected interest rate. Demand
and supply curves for this approximation are plotted in ﬁgure 4.
The supply function in this model is rather simple. During the market session, i.e. before
the realization of the shock, supply equals the sum of required reserves, targeted excess re-
serves, and the diﬀerence between the average forecast of autonomous factors and the present
day forecast. This follows from equation (15) and deﬁnes the vertical part of the supply curve.
Furthermore, via the two standing facilities the central bank provides (and absorbs) an un-
restricted amount of liquidity at the lending (deposit) rate. Hence, there are two horizontal
parts, being equal to the deposit rate for small values of Mt and equal to the lending rate for
large values.
2.4 Expected and unexpected changes in supply
The main purpose of this section is to illustrate the eﬀects supply changes have on the in-
terbank rate. There are fundamental diﬀerences whether these changes happen at the last
day(s) of the maintenance period, or at some earlier days, as well as whether these changes
are expected or unexpected. For the ease of exposition and to concentrate on the eﬀects of
supply changes it is assumed that no underbidding occurs.
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known at the end of each day, the supply of reserves relevant for commercial banks, i.e. the
expected amount of reserves available during the market session, Mt,i st h e ng i v e nb y :


















M = rr + er∗
s and n =m i n {6,T− t}.
The variable vt denotes the daily deviation of the expected autonomous factors from its
expected average value. In other words, the weekly provision of liquidity implies an expected
daily ﬂuctuation for the supply of reserves, which is represented by vt.
At the last day of the reserve maintenance period even a non-zero vT has usually no
impact on the overnight rate, iT. Recall that the central bank allots liquidity such that
liquidity provision is neutral at T,i . e .
PT−1
t=sK vt + vT =0 . The overnight rate at the last
day of the maintenance period, iT, is determined by (RT − MT)=−
³PT−1
t=sK vt + vT
´
+ ϑT.
T h el a s tt e r m ,ϑT, summarizes other variables potentially inﬂuencing the overnight rate apart
from the sum of expected supply changes. This term ϑT includes supply shocks, ut, and the
eﬀects of underbidding. Since the sum of expected supply changes,
PT−1
t=sK vt + vT, is zero
the exact size of vT does not matter for the determination of the overnight rate at T. Under
certain assumptions the term ϑT equals zero and the overnight rate equals then the policy
rate, iT = i∗
T. These assumptions are that 1) all supply shocks having occurred since the
last allotment day sum up to zero, i.e.
PT−1
t=sK−1 ut =0 , 2) the boundary conditions given in
equation (2) have not been hit and 3) supply shocks are distributed symmetrically.
In fact, whenever the central bank makes its allotment decision such that liquidity pro-
vision is neutral at T, the interbank rate at T is not aﬀected by expected moves in the
autonomous factors.20 Nevertheless, if the central bank diﬀers expectedly from the neutral
allotment, the interbank rate at T is likely to react.
Unexpected changes in reserves - supply shocks - enter the demand function at T via the
variable RT. Shocks that occurred before the last allotment of the maintenance period are
neutralized by the central bank latest at the last allotment, hence, do not enter RT.H o w e v e r ,
all shocks which occur after the last allotment do enter the variable RT in the following
20In pratice, however, if the last settlement day happens to fall at day T, it is not so clear whether the
liquidity provision at T is made caring only about the liquidity situation at T.P u td i ﬀerently, liquidity provision
at T might not be totally independent of the expected liquidity situation in the following maintenance period,
and, therefore, creating a non-neutral liquidity situation at T.
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RT =m a x {0,R T−1 − max{0,M T−1 + uT−1}}. (20)
Suppose for simplicity that the last allotment takes place at T − 1, which implies MT−1 is
such that the sum of supply shocks contained in RT−1 are neutralized. As long as uT−1 is
small enough (in absolute values) not to hit th er e s t r i c t i o n si m p o s e db ye q u a t i o n( 2 0 ) ,i t s
eﬀect on RT is linear. However, a shock larger than (RT−1−MT−1) aﬀects RT only up to the
p o i n tt h a ti tm a k e sRT =0 . Similarly, a very large negative shock, uT−1 6 −MT−1, leads to
an automatic recourse to the marginal lending facility, since overdrafts are not allowed. The
only eﬀect that shock has is to neutralize the impact the liquidity supply MT−1 has on the
fulﬁllment of the reserve requirement, that is, to make RT = RT−1.
The discussion of supply changes for other days than the last day of the maintenance
period is based on a simpliﬁed version of the model. The simpliﬁed version includes daily, not
weekly, supply of reserves.21 The demand curve for other than the last day shows a horizontal
part, besides those ones at the lending and deposit rate. Reserves changing within a certain
range do not aﬀect the interest rate. However, for small or large values of Mt,t h ei n t e r e s t
rate it moves away from the expected future interest rate Et[it+1]. Supply shocks have no
impact on the interest rate at all. Recall that a supply shock at t enters the demand equation
at t +1 . In the simpliﬁed version of the model liquidity is provided every day, neutralizing
all past shocks, hence, the supply shock ut does not have any eﬀect neither on it nor on it+1.
The only exception is a very large positive supply shock, big enough to fulﬁll the reserve
requirements for the entire banking sector for the whole maintenance period. In this case the
interest rate on the following day jumps to the deposit rate, i.e. it+1 = id
t+1.
The demand curves, as presented in ﬁgures 3 and 4, serve as benchmark for the empirical
investigation, described in the next section. The exact size of the slopes is estimated and
the assumed functional form is tested for. Furthermore, it is checked whether expected and
unexpected supply changes have the same impact on the interbank rate. It is important to
distinguish between both types of supply changes. As seen above, expected supply changes are
the result of weekly supply of liquidity, hence, an institutional features, whereas unexpected
supply changes are pure forecast errors.
21The graphical representation of the demand curve at t assumes that the central bank provides liquidity
daily, making up for past shocks every day. Therefore the expected interest rate, Et[it+1], does not depend on
shocks and can be taken out of the integral. As described above, liquidity in the euro area is provided only
once a week, and consequently the assumption does not hold in general. However, this simpliﬁcation might
be close to true on a day which happens to be an allotment day and the penultimate day in the maintenance
period at the same time, i.e. for t = sk −1=T −1. Nevertheless, the simpliﬁed version of the model should be
useful for highlighting the basic diﬀerences between the last day of the maintenance period (or, more generally,
the days after the last allotment of a maintenance period) and the days before the last day.
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Underbidding refers to a situation in which the central bank cannot allot its desired amount
of reserves due to insuﬃcient demand.22 If reserves are supplied through ﬁxed rate tender
procedures, or variable rate tenders with a minimum bid rate, an expected interest rate cut
makes current supply relatively expensive, hence, shifting demand into the future. In the euro
area several episodes of underbidding have occurred so far. In general, underbidding is the
equilibrium outcome of rational agents.
In case liquidity not demanded in one week is supplied the following week, underbidding is
deﬁnitely an optimal choice for commercial banks: If expectations are correct and the interest
rate will be cut, reserves will be bought at a lower rate. If interest rates are not cut, the
price in the following week is simply this week’s price. However, if the central bank does not
make up in the following week for liquidity deﬁciencies due to underbidding, the outcome
depends on the demand elasticity. Suppose the supply curve is vertical between the two
rates of the standing facilities, and the demand curve is also vertical at the last day of the
maintenance period. Any supply shortage due to underbidding is not oﬀset in the following
main reﬁnancing operation, hence, it moves the supply curve at the last day of the RMP. This
implies that the interbank rate jumps to the marginal lending rate. Since the interest rate on
a given day is a function of the expected rate at the last day of the RMP, the current interest
rate jumps as well, making underbidding not an optimal choice.23
In the previous section it has been shown that the demand curve at the last day of the
maintenance period is downward sloping. Consequently, a small amount of underbidding
does not push the expected interbank rate to the marginal lending rate. It does increase the
expected rate and therefore also the current interbank rate, but the amount of the increase
depends on both the size of underbidding and the slope of the demand curve. There is
then an equilibrium amount of underbidding, equalizing the current minimum bid rate with
the expected interest rate at the last day of the RMP. Note that the only way to avoid
underbidding in this model is to ﬁne those banks which underbid. If all banks are penalized
in the same way by simply allotting less liquidity than necessary, it is always proﬁtable for
one bank to underbid, given the others do not underbid. Then, in equilibrium all banks will
underbid. However, if a bank has to pay a ﬁne being larger than its potential gains from
22Ewerhart (2002) develops a game theoretic model of liquidity provision to study underbidding and he
discusses ways of eliminating it.
23This holds for any sensible interest rate cut expectation. However, it does not hold, if the interest rate




t)/2, i.e. more than 100 basis points. In other words, if the expected
marginal lending rate is lower than the current minimum bid rate. In this case obtaining liquidity in the future
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will not underbid. Nevertheless, the implementation of such a scheme is very complicated. An
easier way to avoid underbidding is to change the policy rate, as a rule, only at the beginning




The empirical model is heavily based on the demand equations derived from the theoreti-
cal model. In other words, the functional form and the variables included in the estimated
equations are not assumed, rather they come from the ﬁrst order conditions of the theoret-
ical model, representing optimizing behavior of agents. Recall that at the last day of the




T) ∗ F(RT − MT). (21)
In order to estimate this equation a functional form for the distribution function of the supply
shocks, F(.), has to be chosen. The distribution function F(.) is proxied by a linear function,
which is justiﬁed since the interest rate throughout the whole sample reached the upper
bound, the lending rate, only at three very special occasions, the so-called underbidding
episodes. These underbidding episodes are modeled separately, because the behavior of the
interest rate at these days was very diﬀerent from other days. At all other days the relation
between the interest rate, iT,a n d(RT − MT) is well described by the linear part of the
distribution function.
Reserve deﬁciencies, RT, are easy to compute, and the end of the day supply of reserves,
¯ MT = MT +uT, are published on a daily basis by the ECB. Nevertheless, the relevant decision
variable for a commercial bank are the supply of reserves during the market session MT,t h a t
is, expected reserves, which do not include the supply shock uT. Making use of autonomous
factor forecast errors allows the computation of the relevant supply variable, MT.N o t et h a t
RT − MT equals the sum of autonomous factor forecast errors and net recourse to standing
facilities from the last allotment on up to T − 1, RT − MT =
PT−1
t=sk−1(ut + nsft).25 In
the following estimations a series e bt containing accumulated forecast errors and accumulated
24See the public consultation "Measures to improve the eﬃciency of the operational framework for monetary
poliy" at www.ecb.int or ECB (2004).
25This holds strictly only in case of neutral allotment. Note, however that this assumption is indeed fulﬁlled
for almost all days, except allotments around the underbidding episodes.
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Pt−1
j=sl−1(uj + nsfj) with sl being the most
recent settlement day.26 Figure 7 shows a plot of this series.27
On all other days, the demand equation does not depend only on reserve deﬁciencies and
reserve supply, but also the expected interest rate is important for the determination of the
interbank rate. The expected interest rate depends basically on two factors, the expected
policy rate and the expected liquidity situation. The expected policy rate is proxied by a










t are the two and one-week EONIA swap rates, respectively.28 This forward
rate reﬂects the expected one-week rate in one week’s time, which, in general, provides a
good assessment of the expected policy rate.29 The benchmark case, as illustrated in ﬁgure 4,
assumes daily liquidity provision and the demand curve is characterized by a horizontal part.
However, banks might not consider reserve holdings of diﬀerent days as perfect substitutes,
which implies a downward sloping demand curve. Furthermore, the weekly provision of liq-
uidity may introduce non-linearities into the demand curve. From the general model above,
these non-linearities are not precisely deﬁned. The following, testable, speciﬁcation for the
demand curve is proposed. Its main features are: 1) For very large (small) Mt, the interbank
rate equals the deposit (lending) rate; 2) In the absence of a) supply shocks, b) expected
temporary deviations of Mt from its average values, c) expected net recourse to standing fa-
cilities and d) expected policy rate changes, i.e. ut = vt = nsft =( i∗
t+1 −i∗
t)=0for all t,t h e
interbank rate equals the policy rate, it = i∗
t. Note that this is exactly the scenario described
in the benchmark case. The interbank rate is then formulated as a function of deviations from
26This information is not publicly available. I am very grateful to Clara Martin Moss and Steen Ejerskov
from the Monetary Policy Stance Divsion of the European Central Bank who compiled this series and made it
available to me. Their series shows the deviation of the liquidity situation from neutral, expected to prevail at
the next settlement day or the last day of the RMP, whatever comes ﬁrst. In general, this deviation equals the
sum of accumulated forecast errors and accumulated net recourse to standing facilities since the last allotment
day.
27Commercial banks can proxy this variable fairly well.
28Approximating the expected policy rate by other forward rates does not seem to change the results. In
the previous version of the paper forward rates constructed from both Euribor and EONIA swap rates with
maturities of one and two months have been used, but parameter estimates are very similar.
29Short-term money market rates follow the policy rate quite closely, in particular this holds for the one
month rate. Hence, the expected one month rate should follow closely the expected policy rate. For the
predictive power of forward and future rates see e.g. Poole and Rasche (2000) or Gaspar et al. (2001). The
variable needed for the estimation of it is the expected policy rate at t +1 , or more generally, the expected
policy rate within this maintenance period. If the interest rate is expected to change in e.g. ﬁve weeks, the
forward rate changes, but the expected policy rate for this period does not change. In this case, the forward
rate does not provide a good proxy for the expected policy rate. Nevertheless, it is assumed that changes in
the forward rate reﬂect expected changes in this maintenance period’s policy rate, mainly, because agents are
likely to make forecasts at short horizons due to the low precision of long horizon forecasts.
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The liquidity situation at each day, given by Rt and Mt,d i ﬀers from the benchmark due to
supply shocks and anticipated supply changes. Deviations of reserve supply, Mt,a n dr e s e r v e
deﬁciencies, Rt, from the benchmark, Mbench
t and Rbench
t , change the liquidity situation at t,
and potentially move the interest rate away from the policy rate. Liquidity variables expressed
as deviations from the benchmark case are given by:









vj − vt and (23)
Mt − Mbench
t = vt. (24)
It follows that supply shocks and anticipated deviations from the average supply of reserves
have the potential to drive a wedge between the interbank and the policy rate, either directly,
via Rt − Mt and Mt, or indirectly via




Ψ(.) is a general function which needs not be further speciﬁed for the moment. Note that at
all allotment days and at the last day of the maintenance period the sum of expected supply
changes is zero, i.e.
Pt−1
j=sl vj =0for t ∈ {s1 − 1,s 2 − 1,...,s k − 1,T}. Furthermore, liquidity
supply is such that reserve deﬁciencies at any settlement day, Rt for t ∈ {s1,..,s k},d on o t
depend on past supply shocks other than ut−1. Therefore, supply shocks occurring before the
last allotment day, t = sk − 1, are expected to aﬀect the liquidity situation only temporarily,
but are not relevant for the total liquidity situation of the entire reserve maintenance period.
Equally, expected supply changes, vt for all t,a ﬀect the liquidity situation temporarily only.
In contrast, supply shocks occurring after the last allotment day have an eﬀect on the liquidity
situation at T, the last day of the RMP.
One of the central questions in this paper is if temporary changes in supply have an
eﬀect on the interest rate, in other words, if a daily liquidity eﬀect exists. The two sources
of temporary changes are diﬀerent in style and can have diﬀerent implications. If expected
supply changes have an eﬀect on the interest rate on a daily basis, then there exists a daily
liquidity eﬀect. However, if supply shocks have an eﬀect, it might be due to a daily liquidity
eﬀect, but also that commercial banks do not expect supply shocks to be fully oﬀset in the next
allotment decision. A daily liquidity eﬀect results whenever banks do not see daily reserves
as perfect substitutes. Whereas, even if there is no daily liquidity eﬀect, supply shocks aﬀect
25
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Recall that deviations of the liquidity situation from its benchmark are measured by the
sum of forecast errors and net recourse to standing facilities, e bt ≈
Pt−1
j=sl−1(uj + nsfj) with
sl being the most recent settlement day. However, net recourse to standing facilities is very
close to zero on most days, except for some days near the end of the maintenance period, as
c a nb es e e ni nﬁgure 5. Therefore, supply shocks are the main driving forces of the liquidity
situation.
In ﬁgure 6 the interbank rate together with the lending and deposit rate are plotted and
some basic statistics are given in table 1. Normally the interbank rate follows the policy rate,
which is the mid-point of lending and deposit rate, quite closely, but occasionally there are
large spikes. As discussed above, the deviation of the interbank rate from the policy rate can
be caused by changes in liquidity or changes in the expected policy rate. A series for changes
in liquidity and the forward rate, a proxy for the expected policy rate, are plotted in ﬁgures
8 and 9, respectively.
Standard unit root tests conﬁrm that the interest rate, within the sample, is integrated
of order one. Furthermore, it is co-integrated with the policy rate, i∗
t. Therefore, the interest
rates, it,i sm o d e l l e di nﬁrst diﬀerences, ∆it ≡ (it − it−1), and a unit co-integrating vector,
(it−1 − i∗
t−1),i si m p o s e d . 30 The model then is:
∆it = c + φ(it−1 − i∗
t−1)+xtβ + htηt (26)












|ηt−1| − E|ηt−1| + γηt−1
ª
ηt ∼ iid(0,p+( 1− p) ∗ σ2).
The parameter φ captures how fast the interest rate, it, returns to its long-run value, the
target rate i∗
t. The mean equation includes a constant, c, and other explanatory variables,
xt. Deviations of liquidity from the neutral allotment are given by the variable bt.31 The
most recent settlement day is indexed by t = sl. The autocorrelation function in ﬁgure 10
shows clear evidence for conditional heteroskedasticity, which is modeled with an EGARCH
speciﬁcation.32 The conditional standard deviation of the interest rate is given by ht.T h e
30Results on tests for the order of integration and co-integration are not reported. All test results are
available from the author.
31Both, the actual liquidity situation at each day, that is, bt = e bt ≈
Pt−1
j=sl−1(uj+nsfj) and bt ≈
Pt−1
j=sl−1 uj,
the sum of autonomous factor forecast errors alone, are used. Estimation results are practically identical.
32An EGARCH model has some advantages over more standard GARCH models, notably restrictions on
some parameters are not necessary in order to ensure nonnegativity of conditional variances. See for example
Bollerslev et al (1992).
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interest are variables related to the operating procedure and calendar days. Standardized
residuals are denoted by ηt. Frequent small changes and occasionally large spikes characterize
the interbank rate, suggesting the underlying distribution to be a mixture of two normal
distributions.33 The probability to come from the ﬁrst distribution with variance one is p,
and the probability to come from the second distribution with variance σ2 is (1 − p).T h e
exponential GARCH model applied here allows to estimate the diﬀerent impact positive and
negative surprise changes of the interest rate have on the volatility, which is given by the
parameter γ.
The vector dt (zt) may include further explanatory variables for the conditional mean
(variance). This speciﬁcation allows to test for a wide range of possible eﬀects related to the
central bank’s operating procedure and calendar days.
One of the main issues of this paper is the analysis of the liquidity eﬀect. Hence, the
parameters of main interest are those related to the liquidity variables bt. These parameters
can be interpreted as determining the slopes of the demand curves. Note that also lagged
liquidity variables are included in xt, which permits to analyze how fast banks react to changes
in supply. If there is an immediate reaction only bt − bt−1 ≈ ut−1 should be signiﬁcant. On
the contrary, if other liquidity variables are also signiﬁcant one can conclude that banks react
sluggishly to new information. This sluggish reaction might be banks’ choice, or simply reﬂect
the slow diﬀusion of information.
T h el i q u i d i t yv a r i a b l e su s e dh e r ea r et h o s ew h i c hr e ﬂect precisely the liquidity situation
banks are faced with when taking their demand decisions.34 For example, Würtz (2003) uses
the accumulated recourse to standing facilities at the last day of the maintenance period, and
average reserve surplus on other days. Those variables do not measure the prevailing liquidity
situation exactly. The accumulated recourse to standing facilities includes the supply shock
which occurs at the end of the last day of the maintenance period, but banks do not know
the size of this shock when making their decisions. Furthermore, as seen above, it is not
only recourse to standing facilities which deﬁnes the liquidity situation, but also the sum of
forecast errors. In addition, by using average reserve surplus it is not taken into account that
the central bank makes up for past forecast errors and, again, that the end of the day shock
is not known to banks. What is more, the recourse to standing facilities might depend on the
interest rate (see e.g. Thornton, 2001a). In other words, banks might decide actively on the
use of the standing facilities, not only take recourse by force, e.g. in case of overdraft. Then,
33The student t-distribution has also been used, but the mixture of normals allows fatter tails together with
a larger mass around zero, which is supported by the data.
34The same liquidity data is used in Ejerskov et al. (2003). However, they estimate a weekly model for
demand and supply of liquidity.
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in the estimation of the demand curve. The current model does not suﬀer from this caveat,
since forecast errors are by deﬁnition exogenous and, therefore, can be used to estimate the
liquidity eﬀect.35
3.2 Estimation results and discussion
The estimated model is presented in table 2.36 Residuals, standardized residuals and condi-
tional log volatility are plotted in ﬁgures 11, 12 and 13, respectively. Standard tests indicate
that the model is well speciﬁed. There is no serial correlation left neither in the standardized
residuals nor in the squared standardized residuals (see ﬁgures 15 and 16) and the empirical
distribution of the residuals is very close to its assumed distribution (see ﬁgure 17). La-
grange multiplier tests for omitted variables, given in tables 3 to 5, do not show any apparent
misspeciﬁcation. Furthermore, estimated parameters are very stable across sub-samples.37
From the theoretical discussion above it has been seen that institutional details have the
potential of inﬂuencing the interbank rate. Indeed, all key features of the theoretical model are
conﬁrmed by the data. In addition the interbank rate is characterized by some other eﬀects
not showing up directly in the theoretical model, but clearly being related to the operating
procedure. The main results are summarized in table 6, where all predictable patterns of
mean and volatility of the overnight rate are stated. Most of these patterns are related to the
implementation of monetary policy, but also some calendar day eﬀects are present. In what
follows, each of these patterns will be discussed in detail.
It cannot be rejected that the demand curves look like in the benchmark model, as pre-
sented in ﬁgures 3 and 4. In other words, the demand curve is downward sloping only at the
last day of the maintenance period. All four parameters on liquidity at the last day of the
maintenance period are negative and signiﬁcant (panel A in table 2). On all other days the
parameter on liquidity is not signiﬁcant (see panel F in table 5). Hence, on all days other
than the last day of the RMP, the demand curve is ﬂat. Recall that this statement holds
for not too big deviations from a neutral liquidity situation. Furthermore, note that banks
react sluggishly to new information. The interest rate at T diﬀers from its previous day value
also if a change in supply has occurred on the preceding days. It is not only the current
35The estimation results given below are obtained by using the actual liquidity situation at each day, that
is, bt = e bt ≈
Pt−1
j=sl−1(uj + nsfj).R e s u l t sf o rbt ≈
Pt−1
j=sl−1 uj, the sum of autonomous factor forecast errors
alone, are practically identical.
36Numerical optimization has to be applied to estimate this model. Several starting values are used to check
whether a global maximum has been reached. Standard errors are based on the second derivatives of the log
likelihood function. The outer-product estimates are almost identical.
37Parameter estimates presented here are very similar to the estimates contained in the previous version of
this paper, which uses data up to July 2002.
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September 2004supply change, which matters. A positive supply change at T of one billion euro decreases
the interest rate, i.e. (iT − iT−1), by 7.7 basis points. Note that the supply shock at day t
occurs after the market closes, therefore, aﬀecting supply at t+1. Accordingly, uT−1 denotes
the unexpected supply change at day T. If the change in supply occurred before t = T the
interest rate does not react until the last day of the RMP. The eﬀect is signiﬁcantly smaller
than for contemporaneous changes in supply, but still considerable. Lagged supply changes
of one billion euro move the interest rate by around 5 basis points into the opposite direction.
This sluggish reaction might explain why a permanent change in supply, that is a supply
shock after the last allotment day, does not aﬀect the interest rate until the last day. What
is more, allowing the interest rate to react also to lagged supply changes permits to pin down
the liquidity eﬀect more precisely.
Estimating a model with weekly frequency Ejerskov et al. (2003) ﬁnd an asymmetric
liquidity eﬀect. Positive supply changes imply a larger reaction of the interest rate than
negative changes. This asymmetric eﬀe c tc a n n o tb ec o n ﬁrmed in the present analysis, as
indicated by panel G in table 5.
An expected change in the future interest rate should move the current interest rate by
(almost) the same size. One way to measure this relationship is the use of a forward rate.
However, the forward rate at t is not a perfect signal of the expected interest rate at t+1,t h u s
the estimated parameter is likely to be diﬀerent from one. Indeed, a change in the forward
rate moves today’s interest rate, but by less than one. Estimated at the ﬁrst day of a RMP,
a change in the forward rate by 10 basis points increases the interbank rate by 6 basis points.
The forward rate is best used at this day, since it mostly reﬂects expected policy rate changes
within the current maintenance period. For other days, especially for those close to the end of
the maintenance period, expected policy rate changes in the next maintenance period become
more important for the determination of the forward rate. However, expected changes in the
policy rate in the next maintenance period should not aﬀect the current interest rate.
Summarizing, it can be said that transitory changes in supply do not aﬀect the interbank
rate.38 In other words, there is no daily liquidity eﬀect for temporary supply changes. After
the last allotment day all changes in supply as analyzed here are permanent in the sense
that they aﬀect the liquidity situation at the last day of the RMP and, accordingly, the
reserve position of the whole maintenance period. These permanent changes do not impact
on the interest rate till the last day of the maintenance period. The slow diﬀusion of new
information on supply changes, or the low beneﬁts of closely watching total reserve supply
38Transitory changes in supply are measured by the supply shock ut, occuring before the last settlement
day in a reserve maintenance period. However, also deviations of the actual autonomous factors from its
average forecasts, vt, are transitory. In an earlier version of the paper I included the variable vt and found it
insigniﬁcant, which conﬁrms the results presented here.
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September 2004in the market are possible reasons for this ﬁnding. Another potential explanation has been
pointed out by a referee. As outlined in equation (15) both, supply shocks, ut, and expected
deviations of the actual autonomous factors from its average forecast, vt,a ﬀect the daily supply
of reserves. After the last allotment day in a RMP supply shocks are permanent changes,
whereas expected deviations of the autonomous factors, vt, are temporary. Commercial banks
may have diﬃculties to distinguish both types of supply changes. As a consequence, banks
may conclude wrongly that all changes occurring before the very last day of a RMP, but
after the last allotment day, are temporary. Therefore, even permanent changes in supply,
represented by ut, may not have an immediate eﬀect on the interest rate. Rather, the interest
rate may react only at the very last day when it becomes clear which supply changes are
permanent.
There is some evidence that the relation between current and future expected interest rate
is close to one. All in all, a permanent and fully known change in supply should move the
interest rate up to the level expected to prevail at the last day of the maintenance period.
The level of the interest rate at the last day depends on the slope of the demand curve and
the deviation of liquidity from neutral. Assuming that the liquidity change takes place before
the last allotment, the relevant slope is -0.08. Therefore, a liquidity shortage of 13 billion or
more moves the interest rate towards the marginal lending rate.
In the underbidding episodes such permanent liquidity shortages were created. Under-
bidding the weekly allotment by e.g. four billion lower than the neutral amount creates a
total liquidity shortage over the whole week of 4*7=28 billion and, in consequence, leads the
interbank rate to touch the upper bound. This is exactly what can be observed in the data,
which provides corroboration that the eﬀect of permanent and fully expected supply changes
on the interest rate are largely determined by the slope of the demand curve at the last day
of the maintenance period.39 It is important to have in mind that liquidity supply is assumed
to be neutral. However, if the central bank expectedly diﬀers from this policy, the above
described relationships may change as well.
First diﬀerences of the interest rate exhibit slight autocorrelation. This behavior does not
come out directly from the theoretical model and contradicts market eﬃciency. However, in
practice it might be costly to obtain information on supply changes directly, so some banks
might use past interest rates as a proxy for supply changes.
There is no systematic pattern for the mean of the interest rate throughout the reserve
maintenance period, as can be seen in table 3. Various measures are used to test for a
possible increase of the interest rate towards the end of the reserve maintenance period,
but there is no evidence for such an interest rate hike in the present model. Neither the
39See for example Bindseil (2002) or Välimäki (2002).
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inﬂuences systematically the mean of the interest rate (see panel H in table 3). Furthermore,
the mean of the interest rate does not behave diﬀerently at days of the ECB’s Governing
Council meeting or press conference than at other days (see panel L in table 3).
Volatility is higher for days after the last allotment day till the last day of the maintenance
period, as can be seen very clearly in ﬁgure 14. Additionally, there is an increase in volatility
at the ﬁrst day, last day and next to last day in each RMP, as well as at the allotment day
of the last open market operation. Volatility increases also at the day of a policy rate change
and the day after, as well as during underbidding episodes.40 As predicted by the theoretical
model there is no increase neither in the mean nor in the volatility of the interbank rate for
other days before the last allotment day (see table 3).
Positive surprise changes in the interest rate increase volatility more than negative surprise
changes. The relevant parameter γ is estimated to be around 9 percent, as can be seen in
panel H of table 2. Positive changes in the interest rate indicate an increased probability of
ending up the reserve maintenance period with too few reserves, or an expected increase in
the policy rate. Banks may be worried more about not fulﬁlling the reserve requirement than
about holding too many reserves, which then can increase volatility. Alternatively, banks are
likely to view an increase in the policy rate as less favorable than a decrease, which then also
can push up volatility.
One striking diﬀerence of monetary policy implementation in the euro area to other coun-
tries is the low frequency of open market operations. An important question is then to study
the eﬀects of frequency of open market operations. It has been shown that volatility increases
after the last allotment day. Hence, for infrequent open market operations, the period after
the last allotment day becomes longer and therefore the number of days with high volatility
increases. Throughout the sample period the number of days which pass after the last allot-
ment until the last day of the reserve maintenance period varies every month. In general, the
last allotment is performed on Tuesday and the last day in a reserve maintenance period is
the 23rd of each month. However, there have been some recent changes in the operational
framework of the ECB, becoming eﬀective from March 2004 onwards (see e.g. ECB, 2004).
Now, there are always ﬁve (business) days after the last allotment until the last day of the
RMP. It is therefore interesting to test if the volatility increase at the end of the RMP depends
40The underbidding dummy takes value one at the allotment day of the respective underbidding episode.
However, the underbidding dummy may be an endogenous variable. Therefore, a model including the one period
lagged underbidding dummy variable is estimated, as well. In other words, the new model includes a dummy
taking value one at underbidding settlement days. There should be no, possible, problem of endogeneity with
this new variable, because the bidding outcome is announced the day before the settlement day. The estimated
parameters are almost identical with both dummy variables, the original one including allotment days, and the
new one including settlement days.
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in panels D to G in table 3, indicate that the number of days after the last allotment day
does not matter for volatility. It has to be said that this is only a descriptive analysis, which
depends on the current structure of the money market and especially on the current details
of open market operations. No general conclusions are drawn on the eﬀects of changing the
frequency of open market operations.
All the above characteristics of the interbank rate are related in some way or another to
the operating procedure of the central bank. There are some other interesting patterns, which
are pure calendar day eﬀects. At the last day of the month the interbank rate increases by
5 basis points. At the end of the second quarter the increase is 18 basis points and 31 basis
points at the end of the year. However, this increase is reversed on the following day, the ﬁrst
day of the month, as panel B in table 4 indicates. The end of month spikes may arise from
window dressing activities. Volatility of the interbank rate is higher around the end of the
month, too. Nevertheless, a central bank cannot do much about avoiding these predictable
patterns. It has been shown above that there is no daily liquidity eﬀect, i.e. the eﬀect of
a temporary supply changes on the interest rate is insigniﬁcant. In particular, the slope of
the demand curve at the last or ﬁrst day of a month is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, as
can be seen in panel D of table 5. The day of the week does not explain the behavior of the
overnight rate. Neither mean nor volatility of the interbank rate depend on the weekday, as
c a nb es e e ni np a n e lAo ft a b l e4 .
By comparing the reaction of commercial banks to supply shocks one can test the eﬃciency
of banks’ reserve management.41 The theoretical model motivates changes in the interbank
rate as a function of liquidity. The size of the reaction depends on the distribution of supply
shocks. The observed standard deviation of supply shocks is around 7 billion euro for days after
the last allotment day and around 24 billion euro throughout the whole RMP. Relevant supply
shocks are those occurring after the last allotment, because all other shocks are neutralized
in subsequent open market operations. It has been shown that the interest rate at the last
day of the RMP is given by iT = id
T +( il
T − id
T) ∗ F(RT − MT), which can be approximated
by iT =( id
T +1 )+˜ β ∗ (RT − MT). Recalling that (RT − MT) ≈
PT−1
t=sk−1 ut and using the
standard deviation of the supply shocks, it follows that ˜ β ≈− 0.08, which is very close to the
estimated parameter on uT−1.42,43 In other words, the reaction of banks to supply shocks is
41I thank Christian Ewerhart for pointing this out.
42The last settlement day can fall at any weekday. Therefore, on average (RT −MT) contains supply shocks
from three business days. It follows that Va r(RT − MT) ≈ 3 ∗ Va r (u
last
t )=3∗ (7.02)
2,w i t hu
last
t being a
supply shock occuring at or after the last allotment day.
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September 2004fully rational, at least as far as magnitudes are concerned. However, it has been found that
banks react sluggishly to new information, a pattern which is not easily explained for rational
agents. One possible explanation is that banks do not have timely information on the exact
size of the supply shocks. However, banks should be able to proxy the size of the supply
shock fairly well. Alternatively, gains from reacting quickly to supply changes might be small.
Although the exact size of potential proﬁts is still an open question, a preliminary assessment
shows that there may exist some arbitrage opportunities.
From the theoretical model one expects the parameter on uT to be zero, that is, a supply
shock occurring at the end of day T should not have any inﬂuence on the interest rate at that
day. Nevertheless, the estimated parameter is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. One reason
can be that during the market session commercial banks have already some clue about the
size of the supply shock, thus, they can react to it. This seems to make good sense since this
parameter is only diﬀerent from zero at the last day of the RMP, when banks are supposedly
watching their reserve accounts closely.44
4 Conclusions and further research
This paper studies the determinants of the overnight interest rate and quantiﬁes them. The
overnight interest rate is the equilibrium outcome of supply and demand for bank reserves.
The here developed structural model for both supply and demand for reserves allows a detailed
analysis of the interactions between the central bank, as the sole net supplier of reserves, and
commercial banks, on the demand side. The precise set-up of this market, i.e. institutional
details of the reserve market, has important implications for the behavior of the overnight rate,
both for conditional mean and variance. These implications are derived from a theoretical
model and their magnitudes are estimated for the euro area overnight rate.
The overnight rate reacts to expected future changes in the policy rate and to permanent
changes in supply of reserves. In fact, a substantial liquidity eﬀect is estimated: a change in
reserve supply of one billion euro, expected to prevail till the end of the maintenance period,
moves the interbank rate eight basis points into the opposite direction. The theoretical model
relates the magnitude of the liquidity eﬀect to the distribution of supply shocks, which is
conﬁrmed by the data. Interestingly, banks do not react immediately to supply changes. This
sluggish reaction to supply changes is not easily explained for rational agents. Temporary
supply changes have no eﬀect on the overnight rate.
44The alternative interpretation is measurement error. Since the size of the supply shock for T is not
available, it was constructed as: uT = −nsfT −
PT−1
j=sl−1(uj + nsfj). Although it is in principle possible that
uT is measured with some error, there is no obvious reason why the above equation should not hold exactly.
33
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 393
September 2004Predictable patterns are found for the overnight rate. The mean is high at the last day
of a month, even higher on the end of a semester or a year. The end of the month, semester
and year increases are completely reversed at the ﬁr s td a yo ft h ef o l l o w i n gm o n t h . E n do f
month eﬀects are most likely due to window dressing operations. The mean of the overnight
rate does not vary systematically throughout the reserve maintenance period. Therefore, the
short-term money market does not contain clear arbitrage opportunities, with the possible
exception of the sluggish reaction to supply shocks.
The conditional volatility of the overnight rate is closely related to monetary policy im-
plementation. Conditional volatility is especially high at the allotment day of the last open
market operation and even higher at days afterwards. Volatility increases at the day of a
change in the policy rate and around the end of a month.
In this paper the relation between operating procedures and the overnight interest rate has
been analyzed in great detail. However, equally important is how the here identiﬁed eﬀects
work through the yield curve and aﬀect other interest rates. As long as these eﬀects are limited
to the very short end of the yield curve, implications for the economy as a whole are probably
insigniﬁcant. On the contrary, if long-term interest rates react strongly as well, implications
are far more important. Nevertheless, not much is known about this transmission along the
yield curve. Recently Cassola and Morana (2003 and 2004) and Cassola and Moschitz (2004)
have made a ﬁrst step by analyzing volatility transmission along some money market rates.
While the present paper focuses on policy implementation of one particular central bank,
an interesting area of research is the comparison of alternative operating procedures and their
eﬀects on the behavior of interest rates. However, little work has been done so far in this ﬁeld.
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Table 1: Basic statistics for selected series.
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
EONIA rate, in levels  3.343  0.931  0.283  2.043 
EONIA rate, in first differences  0.000  0.143  0.884  16.745 
Forward rate, in levels  3.342  0.900  0.272  1.895 
Supply shock, ut 0.543  24.524  1.363  50.897 
Supply shock, after last allotment day  0.489  7.017  1.800  11.612 
NOTE: The EONIA rate is a volume-weighted average of interbank rates in the euro area. See appendix B for a detailed 
description of the other variables. Sample: All business days from 24/03/1999 to 19/02/2004, both included. 
 
Table 2: Parameter estimates for the Overnight Interest Rate (EONIA).
 
Model:  ∆it = c + φ(it-1 - i
*
t-1) + xtβ + htηt 
              ln(ht
2) = ztλ + Σj δj { ln(ht-j
2) - zt-jλ } + α{|ηt-1| - E|ηt-1| + γηt-1} 
              ηt ~ iid( 0, p + (1-p)*σ
2 ). 
Sample: All business days from 24/03/1999 to 19/02/2004, both included. 
 
Variable Parameter  Std.  Error  p-value 
Mean equation       
(A) Liquidity effects at the last day in a RMP, t = T       
uT-1  -0.077 0.014 0.000 
uT-2  -0.055 0.009 0.000 
uT-3 + uT-4 + uT-5  -0.052 0.009 0.000 
uT  -0.046 0.009 0.000 
      
(B) Expected future policy rate       
Et[i
*
t+k] at the first day in a RMP, t = 1  0.628  0.060  0.000 
Et[i
*
t+k] at other days, t = 2,…,T  0.000  0.007  0.946 
      
(C) Calendar day effects       
End of month, reversed begin of month; except end of semester  0.051  0.002  0.000 
End of 2nd quarter, reversed begin of 3rd quarter  0.178  0.020  0.000 
End of 4th quarter, reversed begin of first quarter  0.310  0.033  0.000 
      
(D) Other variables       
First day in a RMP, t = 1  0.030  0.005  0.000 
dunderbidding -0.303  0.014  0.000 
( it-1 - it-2 )*(1 - first day - begin of month)  0.067  0.011  0.000 
Constant 0.001  <0.001  0.173 
Error correction term (it-1 - i
*
t-1) at the first day in a RMP, t = 1  -1.000  -  - 
Error correction term (it-1 - i
*
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Variable Parameter  Std.  Error  p-value 
Volatility equation       
(E) Days of reserve maintenance period       
First day, t = 1  1.516  0.194  0.000 
Last allotment day  0.841  0.250  0.001 
All days after last allotment  3.045  0.381  0.000 
Next to last day, t = T-1  1.850  0.393  0.000 
Last day, t = T  2.315  0.510  0.000 
      
(F) Calendar days       
End of month and the day before  0.471  0.171  0.006 
Begin and end of a quarter, additionally  1.500  0.665  0.024 
Begin and end of a semester, additionally  2.170  0.455  0.000 
Policy rate change and the day after  1.087  0.287  0.000 
    
(G) Other dummy variables       
dunderbidding 1.754  0.195  0.000 
GC meeting after last allotment (Sep and Oct 1999)  4.028  0.291  0.000 
Underbidding at end of RMP (Dec 2003)  1.047  0.356  0.003 
January 2002 (Cash changeover)  3.175  0.725  0.000 
    
(H) EGARCH parameters       
Constant -6.394  0.151  0.000 
α 2.403  0.211  0.000 
δ 0.678  0.037  0.000 
g 0.089  0.033  0.007 
s 0.203  0.011  0.000 
p 0.324  0.003  0.000 
Standardised residuals:      
Mean 0.019     
Variance 0.368     
Skewness 0.599     
Kurtosis 12.657     
Q(20), p-value  0.023     
Q(20) for squared residuals, p-value  0.970     
NOTE: it = volume-weighted average of interbank rates in the euro area, the EONIA rate. i
*
t = policy rate, or target rate, which is defined as the 
fixed rate (until June 27, 2000) and the minimum bid rate (after June 27, 2000) at which the European Central Bank conducts its weekly open 
market operations. Any change in the policy rate is assumed to become effective at the day of announcement, not at the day when the next open 
market operation is settled. All rates are quoted as annual rates, e.g. it = 5 means a five percent annual interest rate. Liquidity effects in panel A 
are estimated using the relevant supply changes, i.e. those occurring at or after the last allotment day in each RMP. See appendix B and the main 
text for a detailed description of the variables used in the estimation. The parameters in the variance equation represent the effect on the log of 
the conditional volatility. A zero liquidity effect is tested for and then imposed at two underbidding episodes and after Easter 2003. The 
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Omitted variable  p-value 
   Mean Variance   
(A) Dt = 1 at days after last allotment and when t equals:     
T 0.088  - 
T-1 0.016  - 
T-2 0.972  0.033 
T-3 0.007*  0.102 
T-4 0.078  0.465 
      
(B) Dt = 1 at days before last settlement and when t equals:     
T-1 0.333  0.4 
T-2 0.034  0.000* 
T-3 0.144  0.332 
T-4 0.608  0.528 
      
(C) Dt = 1 at all days after last allotment, if last allotment is at:     
T-5 0.589  0.096 
T-4 0.033  0.340 
T-3 0.666  0.171 
T-2 0.185  0.429 
    
(D) Dt = number of days after last allotment minus one and t equals:     
T 0.896  0.448 
T-1 0.061  0.187 
T-2 0.025  0.250 
T-3 0.872  0.076 
      
(E) Dt = five minus number of days after last allotment and t equals:     
T 0.010  0.121 
T-1 0.275  0.190 
T-2 0.062  0.253 
T-3 0.835  0.041 
    
(F) Dt = 1 when t equals T and:      
T is a settlement day  0.077  0.088 
T is NOT a settlement day  0.276  0.106 
T-1 is a settlement day  0.166  0.102 
T-1 is NOT a settlement day  0.486  0.325 
T-2 is a settlement day  0.137  0.317 
T-2 is NOT a settlement day  0.419  0.398 
    
(G) Dt = 1 when t equals T-1 and:      
T-1 is a settlement day  0.043  0.387 
T-1 is NOT a settlement day  0.874  0.102 
T-2 is a settlement day  0.005*  0.097 
T-2 is NOT a settlement day  0.017  0.985 
  0.573 0.972 
(H) Dt = 1 when t falls on:     
The last settlement day in each RMP  0.147  0.237 
The last allotment day in each RMP  0.866  - 
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Omitted variable  p-value 
   Mean     Variance  
(I) Dt = 1 for t = T – k, with k:       
1 0.872    0.399 
2 0.047    0.013 
3 0.074    0.957 
4 0.717    0.414 
5 0.589    0.096 
6 0.300    0.482 
7 0.273    0.485 
8 0.577    0.832 
9 0.160    0.000* 
10 0.802    0.439 
11 0.051    0.014 
12 0.396    0.221 
13 0.123    0.007* 
14 0.407    0.568 
15 0.135    0.503 
16 0.105    0.276 
17 0.950    0.760 
18 0.081    0.749 
19 0.546    0.052 
20 0.192    0.020 
21 0.515    0.605 
        
(J) Dt = 1 when t is the first day in a RMP and falls on:       
Monday 0.346    0.712 
Tuesday 0.798    0.751 
Wednesday 0.877    0.239 
Thursday 0.650    0.878 
Friday 0.628    0.669 
      
(K) Dt = 1 when t is the last day of a RMP and falls on:       
Monday 0.666    0.332 
Tuesday 0.103    0.903 
Wednesday 0.273    0.195 
Thursday 0.980    0.488 
Friday 0.408    0.890 
      
(L) Dt = 1 when t falls on:       
The day of a Governing Council meeting  0.316    0.36 
The day of a press conference  0.665    0.218 
The day of a press conference, before December 2001  0.154    0.195 
All days before November 9, 2001 (bi-weekly policy decisions)  0.019    0.000* 
The day of a policy rate change  0.610    0.665 
The day after a policy rate change  0.237    0.660 
NOTE: See appendix B for a detailed description of the abbreviations used. The variable Dt takes value zero unless 
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Omitted variable  p-value 
   Mean     Variance  
(A) Dt = 1 when t falls on:       
Friday 0.891    0.567 
Thursday 0.622    0.746 
Wednesday 0.956    0.526 
Tuesday 0.892    0.484 
Monday 0.529    0.602 
      
(B) Dt = 1 when t is:       
End of month, except end of semester  0.367    0.004* 
End of 1
st quarter  0.255    0.219 
End of 2
nd quarter  0.848    0.132 
End of 3
rd quarter  0.649    0.749 
End of 4
th quarter  0.944    0.462 
End of any quarter  0.244    0.609 
End of 2
nd and 4
th quarter  0.849    0.170 
End of 1
st and 3
rd quarter  0.214    0.198 
Begin of 1
st quarter  0.944    0.040 
Begin of 2
nd quarter  0.074    0.125 
Begin of 3
rd quarter  0.848    0.416 
Begin of 4
th quarter  0.847    0.405 
Begin of any quarter  0.128    0.597 
        
(C) Dt = 1 for t being the day after:       
Begin of month  0.408    0.166 
Begin of month, except begin of quarter  0.887    0.053 
Begin of 1
st quarter  0.044    0.365 
Begin of 2
nd quarter  0.460    0.177 
Begin of 3
rd quarter  0.041    0.627 
Begin of 4
th quarter  0.704    0.085 
Begin of any quarter  0.115    0.855 
NOTE: See appendix B for a detailed description of the abbreviations used. The variable Dt takes value zero unless 
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dependent and explanatory variables.
Omitted variable  p-value 
   Mean  
(A) Lagged dependent variable:     
Dt = ∆it-2, for all days, t = 1,..,T  0.052   
Dt = ∆it-22, when t = T  0.014   
    
(B) When t is the first day in a RMP and:     
Dt = ∆it-1 0.088   
Dt = ∆it-2 0.950   
Dt = ∆it-3 0.959   
Dt = it-1 – i
*
t-1 0.133   
Dt = it-2 – i
*
t-2 0.709   
Dt = it-3 – i
*
t-3 0.805   
    
(C) Lagged policy rate changes:     
Dt = ∆i
*
t-1 0.598   
Dt = ∆i
*
t-2 0.022   
    
(D) Liquidity effects around end of the month; Dt = ut-1 when t falls on:     
Begin of month  0.779   
End of month  0.524   
Begin of quarter  0.739   
End of quarter  0.616   
    
(E) Liquidity effects at the end of a reserve maintenance period:     
Dt = ut-1, when last allotment was before t and      
t equals T-1  0.976   
t equals T-2  0.903   
t equals T-3  0.280   
    
Dt = ut-2, when last allotment was before t-1 and     
t equals T-1  0.162   
t equals T-2  0.571   
t equals T-3  0.572   
    
(F) Liquidity effects before the last settlement day of a RMP:     
Dt = ut-1, when t is before the last settlement day  0.503   
    
(G) Asymmetric liquidity effects for days after the last allotment:  for Dt  < 0  for Dt  > 0 
Dt = ut-1 and t equals T  0.085  0.136 
Dt = ut-2 and t equals T  0.655  0.583 
Dt = ut-1 and t equals T-1  0.093  0.136 
Dt = ut-2 and t equals T-1  0.397  0.047 
Dt = ut-1 and t equals T-2  0.258  0.832 
Dt = ut-2 and t equals T-2  0.105  0.729 
NOTE: See appendix B for a detailed description of the abbreviations used. The variable Dt takes value zero unless 
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Potential effects  Empirically significant effects 
  Mean Variance 
    
Related to operating procedure    
    
Days of the reserve maintenance period (RMP):     
First day in a RMP, i.e. t = 1  X    
Last allotment day     X 
Any day after the last allotment day      X 
     Next to last day in a RMP, i.e. t = T-1    X 
     Last day in a RMP, i.e. t = T     X 
     Any day before the last allotment day, except t = 1       
      
Day of policy rate change and the day after     X 
    
Liquidity effect at:     
Last day in a RMP, i.e. t = T  X   
Any day after the last allotment day, except t = T      
Any day, except t = 1 and t = T      
Sluggish reaction to supply changes  X   
    
Expected supply change, temporary       
Expected supply change, permanent  X   
    
Expected policy rate  X   
    
    
Related to calendar days     
    
End of month  X  X 
Begin of month  X   
End of semester, additional effect  X   X 
Begin of semester, additional effect  X  X  
End of year, additional effect  X   X 
Begin of year, additional effect  X   X 
     
Weekdays        
    
NOTE: Empirically significant effects are denoted by X. Results are based on the estimated empirical model and 
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Table 7: Description of variables.
Dummy variable  Takes value one at: 
T  The last day of each reserve maintenance period (RMP) 
T-1  The next to last day of each RMP 
First day, t = 1  The first day in a RMP 
Last allotment day  The last day in a RMP at which a regular main refinancing operation is allotted (usually a Tuesday) 
Last settlement day  The last day in a RMP at which a regular main refinancing operation is settled (usually a Wednesday) 
Underbidding  
allotment day 
All allotment days when underbidding occurred. These days are 14/02/01, 11/04/01, 10/10/01, 
07/11/01, 04/12/02, 18/12/02, 04/03/03, 04/06/03, 26/11/03 
dunderbidding     
(Volatility equation) 
All allotment days when underbidding occurred. Additionally, some underbidding settlement days are 
also included. Namely, all underbidding settlement days for February, April and October 2001, and 
both for December 2002 (4th and 18th). Furthermore, this dummy takes value one at days 19/12/02 
till 24/12/02, to take into account volatility increase from underbidding close to the end of the RMP 
dunderbidding         
(Mean equation) 
This variable takes into account the underbidding effects for the mean, in 2002 and 2003. It takes 
value one at Wednesdays for underbidding at December 4, 2002, June 4, 2003 (settlement days), the 
day after settlement March 5, 2003 and the settlement following the underbidding week, March 12, 
2003 
January 2002  The last four days in the first RMP of 2002. Euro cash changeover 
GC meeting after last 
allotment 
Governing Council meeting after the last allotment and policy rate change expectations. Takes value 
one the days before the last allotment, 20/9/1999 and 18/10/1999 and the days before and after it, i.e. 
17/9/99 and 19/10/1999 
Underbidding at end of 
RMP 
Allotment and settlement days of  the last regular main refinancing operation in the December 2003 
RMP, 16 and 17/12/2003 
Policy decisions bi-
weekly 
All days until 7th of November 2001. From this time onwards policy decisions are made only once a 
month (in general) 
Press conference  The day of the press conference held after the ECB’s Governing Council meeting 
Governing Council 
meeting 
The day of the European Central Bank’s Governing Council meeting 
Policy rate change  The day at which a change in the policy rate is announced 
  
Other variables   
it  Volume-weighted average of interbank rates in the euro area, the EONIA rate. 
i
*
t  Policy rate, or target rate, which is defined as the fixed rate (until June 27, 2000) and the minimum bid 
rate (after June 27, 2000) at which the European Central Bank conducts its weekly open market 
operations. Any change in the policy rate is assumed to become effective at the day of announcement, 
not at the day when the next open market operation is settled 
Et[i
*
t+k]  Expected future policy rate. Proxied by a forward rate constructed with one and two-week EONIA 
swap rates 
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Figure 2: Timing in the interbank market. In general, supply of liquidity is constant through-
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Figure 3: Demand and supply of bank reserves at the last day of a reserve maintenance period.
MT denotes current reserve holding and RT the amount of reserves necessary to fulﬁll the
reserve requirement for the entire reserve maintenance period. The overnight rate is denoted
by iT, marginal lending and deposit rates by il
T and id
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Figure 4: Demand and supply of bank reserves at days other than the last day of the RMP.
Simpliﬁed model. Mt denotes current reserve holding. The overnight rate is denoted by it





































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Euro area interbank rate (EONIA) together with deposit and marginal lending














































































































































Figure 7: Deviation from neutral liquidity.
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Figure 10: Autocorrelation function for squared residuals from Least Square estimation. Dot-
































































































































Figure 11: Residuals from EGARCH model.
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Figure 13: Logarithm of Conditional Volatility from EGARCH model.
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Figure 14: Logarithm of Conditional Volatility from EGARCH model (left scale). Dotted
lines represent a dummy variable taking value one on all days after the last allotment day
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Figure 15: Autocorrelation function for residuals from EGARCH model. Dotted lines repre-
sent signiﬁcance at 1%.
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Figure 16: Autocorrelation function for squared residuals from EGARCH model. Dotted lines
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Figure 17: Estimated and assumed distribution of residuals from EGARCH model.
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